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1.  Introduction 
Pursuant to art. 45 of the Solvency II Framework Directive (2009/138/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 25 Nov. 2009 on Solvency II [OJ L 335/1 of 17.12.2009]), all 
insurance undertakings will be obliged to conduct an “Own Risk and Solvency Assessment” 
(ORSA). As can be derived from its legislative position within the framework directive, 
ORSA represents an integral part of the undertakings’ risk management system.  
 
One would, however, be mistaken to assume that ORSA’s relevance is limited to the second 
pillar of Solvency II, where mainly qualitative requirements are to be found. ORSA rather 
exhibits strong interlinks with the first pillar and its quantitative requirements. However, 
ORSA may also serve as a trigger for transparency duties which form Solvency II’s third 
pillar. ORSA will hereby equally become a basis for the supervisory review process (SRP) in 
the course of which national supervisory authorities might implement supervisory measures 
with regard to any one of the three pillars. ORSA may thus be described in some respects as 
the glue that binds all three pillars of Solvency II together. Despite this fact, ORSA has 
hitherto remained surprisingly ill-defined. The interplay between the calculation of the 
solvency capital requirements in Pillar I and ORSA in particular have not yet been 
conclusively clarified. 
2.  Properties of ORSA 
Since the draft of the Regulatory Technical Standards, which are to be passed in the form of a 
regulation on the second Lamfalussy level, does not provide for any detailed regulation of the 
ORSA, any assessment of the latter must for the moment begin and, unfortunately, end with 
the definition given by the Solvency II Directive. According to art. 45 of said directive, ORSA 
should describe the “overall solvency needs” of an insurer, its continuous compliance with the 
capital requirements of Pillar I and an assessment of the significance of different assumptions 
made for Pillar I calculations and for the ORSA. Furthermore, ORSA’s goal is also a long-
term assessment of an insurer’s solvency situation. In addition, ORSA is to be an integral part 
of the insurer’s business strategy and its strategic decision-making. This, however, should not 
be misunderstood: ORSA “shall not serve to calculate a capital requirement” (art. 45 [7]). 
ORSA rather consists of a qualitative and a quantitative component, the latter’s purpose being 
not the calculation of a capital requirements distinct from those of Pillar I, but rather twofold: 
on the one hand, ORSA’s task consists of evaluating whether the standard formula is sufficient 
to address adequately all risks to which the undertaking is exposed. The undertaking has to 2 
 
determine its own specific risk profile and has to evaluate whether this risk profile deviates 
significantly (!) from the assumptions underlying the standard formula. On the other hand, 
and this shall be the main focus here, ORSA is to project these capital requirements into 
another time frame and to reevaluate them under the overall risk exposure with a medium and 
long-term horizon.  
 
This being said, ORSA goes beyond Pillar I in two ways: 
 
1.  Besides the actual risk and solvency assessment, in its ORSA, an insurer has to 
demonstrate satisfactorily the presence of adequate processes that identify and assess 
its risks properly. 
2.  In contrast to Pillar I’s one-year time horizon, ORSA has an explicit long-term horizon 
of the solvency assessment. 
 
As for the second point, the calculations of the solvency capital requirements and the 
determination of an insurer’s own funds under Pillar I form the natural starting point of every 
undertaking’s ORSA. However, one must differentiate in terms of whether the insurer applies 
the standard formula under Pillar I, a partial internal model or a full internal model for these 
calculations.  
3.  Long-Term Risk and Solvency Assessment 
If we assume that a full internal model is adequately able to map the risk and solvency 
situation of an insurer, it should be a straightforward exercise to extend such a full internal 
model to a long-term time horizon. Problems of extending the Pillar I calculations into a 
multi-year context arise first and foremost for those insurers that apply partial internal models 
or the standard formula. 
 
The modular structure of the standard formula builds an obstacle to its multi-year extension. It 
is particularly unclear how the capital requirements in the different risk modules and their 
submodules would have to be adjusted to lead to a desired multi-year solvency level. 
Incidentally, this issue also applies to internal models that have a modular approach like the 
standard formula. 
 
Users of the standard formula, who probably prefer it to an internal model for cost reasons, 
therefore fear that they might be forced to install a full internal model due to the ORSA 
regulations. This is certainly not the intention of the Solvency II Directive (cp. recital 36). The 
Directive, nevertheless, does not offer any guidance as to how small and medium-sized 
undertakings are to achieve their ORSA without developing an internal model and still have 
the ORSA address their specific overall solvency needs. One could come to the conclusion 
that the users of the standard formula are required to square the circle when undertaking their 
own risk and solvency assessment. 
 
In reality, the situation is not necessarily as dire as that and the solution we put forward can be 
outlined as follows: the standard formula is based on the risk situation of a representative 
insurance company (subsequently referred to as the “standard insurer”). Its explicit 
characteristics, such as the structure of its life or non-life underwriting portfolio and the 
composition of its different asset classes, should be published by EIOPA and should then 
serve  as the relevant benchmark. This implies a translation of the assumptions on the 
underlying probability distributions into directly observable characteristics. In line with art. 45 3 
 
1(c) of the Directive, an insurer could then assess in which areas and to what extent its 
individual characteristics deviate from those of the standard insurer. The underwriting 
portfolio or the equity portfolio might, for example, exhibit a higher or a lower risk level 
compared to those of the standard insurer. This comparison would enable a standard formula 
user to assess in a first step its own risk and solvency situation. The insurer can describe the 
deviations from the standard insurer both qualitatively and quantitatively. Based on this 
assessment, the insurer can outline through which measures it intends to mitigate those risks 
that exceed those of the standard insurer: greater own funds, more reinsurance coverage etc. 
The chosen measures may differ depending on the underlying time horizon. 
 
The supervisory authorities, in turn, also referring to the deviations from the standard insurer, 
can then assess to what extent the proposed measures and processes are adequate or whether a 
capital add-on according to art. 37 of the Directive might be necessary. One should keep in 
mind, however, that ORSA is not intended to calculate a capital requirement. Therefore, the 
exposition of inadequately addressed risks by ORSA cannot automatically result in the setting 
of a capital add-on. It can be expected that EIOPA, over the years, will formulate best practice 
guidelines to estimate the adequateness of chosen risk management measures. 
 
The proposed comparison with the standard insurer as the core of ORSA for standard formula 
users is, of course, a relatively crude procedure. However, “crudeness” also applies to the way 
the standard formula determines the solvency capital requirement. Our proposal therefore 
keeps up the intended degree of sophistication by transferring it from Pillar I to the ORSA. If 
the users of the standard formula were not given such a benchmark for comparison, the 
undertakings would, against the legislative will of the drafters of the directive, have to 
continuously assess whether their overall solvency needs can be adequately calculated by the 
standard formula. It is difficult to see how such an assessment would then not indirectly 
require the establishment of some form of internal model. The establishment of the “standard 
insurer” thus seems to be an almost indispensable tool. 
4.  Implications for the present “preparatory phase” 
In light of the retardation of the implementation of the Solvency II Project, EIOPA has 
decided to propose the adaptation of several guidelines in order to prepare the insurers for the 
future application of Solvency II. One such set of guidelines also addresses the forward-
looking assessment of the undertakings’ own risks (EIOPA, BoS-13/25 and EIOPA-CP-
13/009). The guidelines – that are to be imposed by the national supervisors beginning in 
2014 – thus aim to prepare the undertakings for their future duties to conduct an ORSA. 
 
The question thus arises of whether the creation of a “standard insurer”, as outlined above, 
would already be necessary in this preparatory phase. At first glance, one tends to answer in 
the negative, since the guidelines focus particularly on the implementation of processes and 
procedures and not on the overall solvency needs in terms of numbers. The consultation paper 
for the guidelines thus sets out that the guidelines focus “on what is to be achieved by this 
assessment rather than on how it is to be performed” (para. 1.12). This is not at all surprising, 
since the ORSA exhibits a strong interconnection with the quantitative requirements of 
Pillar I, which are not yet in force. 
 
The legal situation will, however, not be as simple as that. In the following section, the 
guidelines declare that insurers must also assess their overall solvency needs quantitatively 
(cp. guidelines n
os 11 et seqq.) and that these quantitative assessments will require insurers to 4 
 
perform their duties under the working hypothesis that the Solvency II capital requirements 
are already binding. This would put users of the standard formula (i.e. all insurers that do not 
opt for the pre-application for Internal Models [see EIOPA-CP-13/011]) under considerable 
strain. This problem is to some degree mitigated by guideline n
o 3 which sets a threshold that 
only such insurers that fall within the category of those insurers that collectively represent at 
least 80 % of the market share are to be legally required to base their quantitative assessment 
on the assumption that the Solvency II quantitative requirements of Pillar I already apply 
[concerning the calculation of the market share, the guidelines refer to the guidelines n
os
 
 5 et 
seqq. of the transparency guidelines (EIOPA-CP-13/010)]. This helps, however, only such 
small and medium-sized insurers that make up the remaining 20 % of the market share. They 
would need – though this may be arguable – to base their risk evaluation not on the capital 
requirements of Solvency II, but rather on the national capital requirements (based on 
Solvency I) in force in their home country.  
This leaves, however, all users of the standard formula that belong to the 80 % category 
exposed to the same problem regarding ORSA that will arise once Solvency II is finally 
implemented. For them, the situation during the preparatory phase will be rather precarious. 
Insurers will have to meet the existing capital requirements of their home country and will, 
where applicable, have to fulfil the forward-looking assessment based on these capital 
requirements. They will now also be required to make an additional forward-looking 
assessment based on the hypothesis that the Solvency II capital requirements already apply. 
Given this situation, it would seem questionable to require users of the standard formula – 
they are, to be more precise, hypothetical users of the standard formula – to establish quasi 
internal models in order to assess how and why their risk profile differs from the assumptions 
underlying the standard formula. Again, a straight-forward and workable solution would be 
for EIOPA to establish a standard insurer which would serve as a point of reference for users 
of the standard formula when fulfilling their duty under guideline n
o
 
 16, which requires 
companies to assess the deviation of their risk profile from the underlying assumptions of the 
standard formula.  
Whilst this would certainly put EIOPA under considerable time pressure, the creation of the 
standard insurer within the preparatory phase would have two advantages. Firstly, it would 
alleviate the pressure on users of the standard formula in this especially burdensome period. 
Secondly, EIOPA would be able to refine the characteristics of the standard insurer and test 
them against reality in order to establish a finely tuned frame of reference once the 
Solvency II regime becomes binding on the insurers.  
5.  Conclusion 
Since the adaptation of the Solvency II Directive, ORSA has, to some extent, remained its 
most enigmatic component. This was caused by the fact that ORSA is one of the most obvious 
examples of the supervisory shift from a rules-based to a principles-based approach. As such, 
ORSA has hitherto been only very roughly defined. Whilst the move towards a more 
principles-based supervision was generally met with strong support, the same was not true for 
the rather ill-defined nature of ORSA. It is possible that the  general human fear of the 
uncertain has turned ORSA into something of a bogeyman for small and medium-sized 
undertakings. They dread that ORSA will require them through the back door, despite their 
application of the standard formula on Pillar I, to establish an internal model in order to assess 
whether their overall solvency needs are adequately addressed by the standard formula. This 
fear is not completely without basis. In the present contribution, however, we have attempted 5 
 
to point out a way to cut through the red tape. Since it is for the undertaking to determine its 
own specific risk profile and to evaluate whether this risk profile deviates significantly from 
the assumptions underlying the standard formula, it seems only natural that the supervisor 
must specify in greater detail what these underlying assumptions are. The most practicable 
way to do so would be for EIOPA to establish a “standard insurer”, which implies a 
translation of the assumptions concerning the underlying probability distributions into directly 
observable characteristics. Whether the establishment of such a legal fiction can be achieved 
before EIOPA’s preparatory guidelines are enacted seems doubtful. If EIOPA is correct in its 
assessment that these guidelines will for the most part focus on processes rather than on sheer 
numbers, the creation of the standard insurer might not seem the most pressing item on the 
agenda. However, it would be an important step towards relaxing the insurers’ fear of what 
ORSA might bring about. 
 